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THE NEW JUDGMENT LIEN LAW
Among the acts passed at the recent session of the Washington
legislature, and wnch became effective June 12, 1929, is one entitled
"An Act relating to judgments, their duration, lien, assignment
and satisfaction and repealing certain acts relating thereto." 1 This
act purports to be a comprehensive and complete declaration of the
law upon the subject-matter set forth in the title, to apply to judg-
ments of both state and federal courts, and to repeal existing laws
relating to .the matters covered by the act.
The principal purpose of its enactment was to repeal the existing
provisions of the code relating to the lien of judgments of federal
courts which were clearly invalid in the light of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Rhea v. Smith,2
and to substitute therefor provisions deemed valid and applicable.
The problem to be considered herein is whether the new act accom-
plishes that particular purpose or object.
It is, of course, a fundamental principle that the force and effect
of judgments and decrees depends upon the will of the sovereignty 3
The United States and each of the states are sovereign powers, and
have the power, subject to constitutional limitations, to declare
judgments of its courts shall be liens and to fix the particulars
-thereof, and no one of these sovereignties can interfere with the
exercise of this right by the others within their respective jurisdic-
tions.' So it is within the power of Congress to declare the judg-
ments of federal courts shall be liens and to prescribe the time of
commencement, mode of creation, and other details as it may see
fit, independent of and without regard to the laws of any state. 5
Instead of declaring that judgments and decrees of federal courts
shall be liens according to prescribed rules uniformly applicable to
'Laws of Wash. 1929. Chap. 60, p. 56 et seq.
-274 U. S. 434, 71 L. ed. 1139, 47 Sup. Ct. 698 (1927).
Corwzn v. Benham, 2 Oh. St. 36 (1853).
'Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 375, 13 Sup. Ct. 370, 37 L. ed. 209 (1893)
Ward v. Chamberlasn, 2 Black. 430, 17 L. ed. 219 (1863) Dartmouth Sav-
ings Bk. v. Bates, 44 Fed. 546 (1890) Blair v. Ostrander, 109 Ia. 204, 80
N. W. 330, 77 Am. St. R. 532, 47 L. R. A. 469 (1899) Corwzn v. Benham,
note 3 supra.
'Same cases as note 4.
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federal courts' judgments throughout the United States, Congress
has elected to adopt the law of each state and to make the same apply
to judgments of federal courts within the state.6
By section 1 of the existing act Congress consented that each state
might make applicable to the lien of federal court judgments the
rules governing the time of commencement and mode of creation of
the lien of judgments of courts of the state of first instance of
general jurisdiction. So whether a state law upon that matter
is valid or not, depends upon whether it complies with the condi-
tion imposed by the federal law, whether the state act conforms
the lien of federal court judgments to the lien of judgments of the
state's courts of first instance of general jurisdiction, or differen-
tiates between the judgments of the two sets of courts in that mat-
ter.
In Rhea v. Smith, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States
had under consideration this state of facts A pecuniary judgment
had been rendered by the federal district court in Jasper county
against one Whitlock, who owned land in that county Afterwards,
Whitlock sold and conveyed the land to Smith. Subsequently an
6Act of August 1, 1888; U. S. Comp. Stat. 1916, sec. 1606, Fed. Stat.
Ann. 2 ed., p. 608; 25 Stat. at L. 357, which reads as follows: "See. 1. Thejudgment and decrees rendered in a circuit court or district court of
the United States within any state, shall be liens on property throughout
such state in the same manner and to the same extent and under the
same conditions only as if such judgments and decrees had been rendered
by a court of general jurisdiction of such state: Provided, that whenever
the laws of any state require a judgment or decree of a state court to be
registered, recorded, docketed, indexed, or any other thing to be done in
a particular manner, or in a certain office or county or parish in the
state of Louisiana, before a lien shall attach, this act shall be applicable
therein whenever and only whenever the laws of such state shall authorize
the judgments and decrees of the United States courts to be registered,
recorded, docketed, indexed, or otherwise conformed to the rules and re-
quirements relating to the judgments and decrees of the courts of the state.
"See. 2. That the clerks of the several courts of the United States shall
prepare and keep in their respective offices complete and'convenient indices
and cross-indices of the judgment records of said courts, and such indices
and records shall at all times be open to the inspection and examination of
the public."
When the foregoing act was originally enacted, it also contained a third
section which read as follows: "See. 3. Nothing herein shall be construed
to require the docketing of a judgment or decree of a United States court,
or the filing of a transcript thereof, in any state office within the same
county or parish in the state of Louisiana in which the judgment or decree
is rendered, in order that such judgment or decree may be a lien on any
property within such county'" This section was amended by an act ap-
proved March 3, 1895, 28 Stat. at L. 813, 814, ch. 180, which added after the
last word "county" to the words "if the clerk of the United States court
be required by law to have a permanent office and a judgment record open
at all times for public inspection in such county or parish." This section
3, as so amended, was repealed January 1, 1917, 39 Stat. at L., p. 531, ch. 397.
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execution issued on the judgment, the land was levied upon, and
an execution sale thereof was made to Rhea. This resulted in the
suit of Rhea v. Smith, wherein Smith contended the judgment
against Whitlock had not been a lien on the land when he, Smith,
bought it, for the reason a transcript of the judgment had not
been filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of Jasper
county as required by the Missouri statute governing the lien of
federal court judgments. The Supreme Court of Missouri held the
statute valid and applicable and, therefore, decided in favor of
Smith. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States over-
ruled the decision of the Missouri court, holding the Missouri
statute7 invalid.
The court said.
"The Missouri statutes prescribe that judgments ren-
dered by any state court of record shall be a lien on the real
estate of the person against whom they are rendered, situ-
ate in the county for which the court is held, and the lien
shall commence on the day of the rendition of the judgment
and shall continue for three years. They further provide
that judgments obtained in the Supreme Court of the state,
in any federal court held within the state, and in the Court
of Appeals of either Kansas City or St. Louis, shall upon
the filing of a transcript in the office of the clerk of any
circuit court be a lien on the real estate of the person
against whom such judgment or decree is rendered, situate
in the county in which such transcript is filed.
"It is very clear from tins recital that a lien of a judg-
ment of the federal court upon lands in the county in which
7 The Missouri statutes quoted in the decision, read as follows: "Sec.
1554. Lien of judgment in Supreme Court, Courts of Appeals, and Federal
Courts in this State. Judgments and decrees in the Supreme Court, in any
United States District or Circuit Court held within this state, in the
Kansas City Court of Appeals, or in the St. Louis Court of Appeals, shall,
upon the filing of a transcript thereof in the office of the clerk ot any
circuit court, be a lien on the real estate of the person against whom suchjudgment or decree is rendered, situate in the county in which such tran-
script is filed.
"Sec. 1555. Lien in Courts of Record, Generally. Judgments and decrees
rendered by any court of record shall be a lien on the real estate of the
person against whom they are rendered, situate in the county for which the
court is held.
"Sec. 1556. The Commencement, Extent, and the Duration of the Lien.
The lien of a judgment or decree shall extend as well to the real estate ac-
quired after the rendition thereof as to that which was owned when thejudgment or decree was rendered. Such liens shall commence on the day of
rendition of the judgment, and shall continue for three years, subject to be
revived as hereinafter provided; but when two or more judgments or
decrees are rendered at the same term, as between parties entitled to suchjudgments or decrees, the lien shall commence on the last day of the term
at which they are rendered."
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it sits, if we give effect to the state statute, cannot be a
lien unless a transcript of the judgment shall be made and
filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the
state in that county, whereas no such transcript of a judg-
ment in the state circuit court is required to create a lien
for its judgment, but the lien takes effect the minute that
it is entered on its record. Not only is this true with
respect to the state circuit court of the county, a court
of general jurisdiction, but it is also true of judgments
in the county court and in the probate court of that county
which are courts of record.
"It is obvious, however, that the district court of the
United States is a court of first instance of general juris-
diction just as the circuit courts of the various counties in
Missouri are courts of general jurisdiction of the first in-
stance. The conformity required should obtain as between
them, and not as between the federal court and the state
appellate courts.
"Reference is made by the state Supreme Court to In re
Jackson Ight & Traction Co. (C. C. A. 5th), 269 Fed.
223, a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Fifth Circuit concerning a judgment rendered in Missis-
sippi, holding that the required conformity was furnished
by the state statute. The statute required the enrollment
of a judgment in the state court of general jurisdiction in
order that it might become a lien upon the property in
the county of its jurisdiction, only if enrolled twenty days
after the term of entry of the judgment. The judgments
of the federal court, the state Supreme Court and the
chancery courts also become liens from the time they are
enrolled in the county where the land lay We think that
case may well be distinguished from this one because nec-
essity of enrollment was exacted as to every court.
"It is the inequality which permits a lien instantly to
attach to the rendition of the judgment without more in
the state court, which does not so attach in the federal
court in that same county, that prevents compliance with
the requirement of section 1 of the act of 1888. In the Mis-
sissippi case, above referred to, there was the same formal-
ity of enrollment within twenty days after the judgment in
order to secure a lien in both the state court and the federal
court in the county where both sat.
"We think that the three sections, 1555, 1556 and 1554,
do not secure the needed conformity in the creation, extent
and operation of the resulting liens upon land as between
federal and state court judgments. The lien of federal
court judgments in Missouri therefore attaches to all lands
of the judgment debtor lying in the counties within the
respective jurisdictions of the two federal District Courts
in that state. This requires a reversal in this case of judg-
ment of the Supreme Court of Missouri. The cause is
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remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion."
For a clear understanding of the problem under consideration,
let us consider the provisions of the Washington statute8 which
was repealed by the new act and the invalidity thereof in the
light of the Rhea v. Smith decision.
Under the former Washington law, a judgment became a lien
on the debtor's property situate m the county in which the judg-
ment was rendered, "from the date of entry thereof" where ren-
dered by the superior court of that county, but "from the time
of the filing and indexing of a duly certified transcript or abstract"
of the judgment "with the county clerk of the court" where the
judgment was rendered by a federal court in that county The
statute made a marked differentiation as to the time of commence-
ment and mode of creation of lien as between judgments of the
superior court and of the federal court rendered in the same
county, and between judgments of the superior court in the county
of rendition and judgments of a federal court rendered in some
other county The only conformity effected was as to time of
commencement and mode of creation of lien of judgments of
superior and federal courts in counties other than those of ren-
dition.
In Rhea v. Smith, supra, it is clearly stated that to be valid a state
law must conform the lien of federal district court judgments to
the lien of the state's courts of first instance of general jurisdic-
tion.8
3 Sess. L. 1893, p. 65, ch. 42. That statute declared: "The real estate of
any judgment debtor and such as he may acquire, shall be held and bound
to satisfy any judgment of the district or circuit court of the United States,
if rendered in this state, or of the superior or supreme court, or any 3udg-
ment of a justice of the peace, for the period of five (5) years from the day
on which said judgment was rendered, and such judgments shall be a lien
thereupon to commence as follows: Judgments of the superior court of the
county in which real estate of the judgment debtor is situated, from the
date of entry thereof; judgments of the district or circuit courts of the
United States, if rendered in this state; judgments of the supreme court;judgments of the superior court of any county other than the county i
which said judgment was rendered, and the judgments of a justice of the
peace, from the time of the filing and indexing of a duly certified tran-
script or abstract of such judgments, as provided by this act, with the
county clerk of the county in which said real estate is situated."
0 Of this latter class are the circuit courts in Missouri and the super-
ior courts in Washington.
It is interesting to compare the provisions of the Missouri statutes and
of the formerly existing statutes of Washington governing the lien of the
judgments of federal courts and of the state's courts of the first instance of
general jurisdiction in the county of RENDITION. In Missouri judgments
of the circuit court are a lien from time of redemption; judgments of the
federal district court are a lien from the time of filing a transcript thereof
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Manifestly, the former Washington law was subject to the dis-
approval accorded the Missouri law by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Rhea v. Smith, supra,
That decision caused the enactment of the new judgment lien
law 10
Subdivision (a) of section 2 of the new act" effects an exact
conformity or identity of time of commencement and mode of
creation of lien as between judgments of the federal court in the
county of RENDITION and judgments of the superior court ren-
dered in that SAME county Thus, the act effects conformity as
to the operation as liens on the debtors' property situated in King
county of judgments of the federal court and superior court
rendered in that county There is also conformity or identity of
time of commencement and mode of creation of lien in all counties
other than that of rendition as between federal and superior court
judgments. But the new act does not effect conformity between
the lien in the county of rendition of judgments of the superior
court and the lien in that same county of judgments of the federal
district court rendered in another county, though the county first
referred to is within the jurisdiction or district of the federal court.
For example, there is no equality as to lien between a judgment
rendered in King county by the federal district court against a
debtor owning property in Kitsap county, and a judgment ren-
dered against the same debtor by the superior court in Kitsap
with the clerk of the state circuit court. In Washington judgments of the
superior court are a lien from the time of entry" judgments of the federal
district court are a lien from the time of filing and indexing a transcript
thereof. The Washington law imposed not only the like requirement im-
posed by the Missouri law upon federal court judgment creditors, that of
filing a transcript, but also the additional prerequisite to the creation of
a lien, viz., indexing.
10 Sess. L. 1929, p. 56, ch. 60. The provision thereof material to our in-
quiry reads as follows: "See. 2. The lien of judgments upon the real estate
of the judgment debtor shall commence as follows:
"(a) Judgments of the district court of the United States rendered in
the county in which the real estate of the judgment debtor is situated, andjudgments of the superior court for the county in which the real estate of
the judgment debtor is situated, from the time of the entry thereof;
"(b) Judgments of the district court of the United States rendered in
any county in this state other than that in which the real estate of thejudgment debtor to be affected is situated, judgments of the supreme court
of this state, and judgments of the superior court for any county other than
that in which the real estate of the judgment debtor to be affected is situ-
ated, from the time of the filing of a duly certified abstract of such judg-
ment with the county clerk of the county in which the real estate of the
Judgment debtor to be affected is situated, as provided in this act."
2 See previous footnote for text.
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county The latter judgment, under tins new act, would operate
as a lien immediately upon its entry, at the moment the formal
written judgment signed by the judge is filed with the county
clerk. But the judgment of the federal court would not operate
as a lien on the debtor's property in Kitsap county until the judg-
ment had been entered with the clerk of the federal court, and a
certified transcript obtained and filed, with the clerk of Kitsap
county Here appears a discrimination against a federal court
judgment creditor to the advantage of a superior court judgment
creditor in all such cases, for the jurisdiction of the federal court
sitting in King county embraces Kitsap county as well as King and
other counties in the Western District of Washington.
In Rhea v. Smith it is said.
"We are dealing here with a question necessarily of
great mcety in determimng the effect and the priority of
liens upon real estate, and the subject requires exactness.
Merely approximate conformity with reference to such a
subject-matter will not do, especially where complete con-
formity is entirely possible."
Is "complete conformity entirely possible" in this state? It is.
It could be provided that no judgment shall operate as a lien until
a certified abstract or transcript thereof is filed in the office of
the auditor of the county in which the debtor's property is situate.
Abstracts or transcripts of judgments could be required to be
recorded and indexed in that office in books kept for that pur-
pose, and merely for the purpose of evidencing and affording a
means of notice and ascertainment of the existence of such liens.
The clerk of the court would continue to keep the existing system
of judgment or execution dockets and indexes thereto, and all pro-
ceedings for the enforcement of judgments continue as at present.
Or, as an alternative, it appears that conformity could be accom-
plished by providing no judgment shall be a lien until a certified
abstract or transcript thereof is obtained and filed with the clerk
of the county in which the debtor's property is situate. The pres-
ent system would continue in effect, but the additional step sug-
gested would be necessary to establish a judgment lien, and a judg-
ment lien docket with index thereto would be required. This course
would require a creditor upon entering his judgment with the
clerk of the county of rendition, to ask that a certified abstract or
transcript thereof be prepared, to secure the same and file it with
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the same clerk to effect a lien m that same county Although rather
an anomalous procedure, it would nevertheless be necessary to
accomplish conformity under such a system.
Under either of these modes, the docketmg, or, as it is designated
in some jurisdictions, enrollment of a judgment of any court, state
and federal, whether rendered m the county where docketed or in
other counties, would be necessary in order to give it effect as a
lien. There would be an absolute conformity, or identity of time
of commencement and mode of creation of lien of the judgments
of state and federal courts. F C. HACKMAN.
*Of the Seattle Bar.
